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Abstract: 
Debt-for-nature swaps have emerged as one method for debt burdened nations to retire 
their foreign debt through international markets.  In a typical debt-for-nature swap, conservation 
groups buy some portion of a nation's debt, usually in secondary markets at discounted prices, in 
return for long-term commitments from the country to preserve domestic ecological zones.  The 
first debt-for-nature swap occurred in Bolivia in 1987.  Since then these programs have been 
used by a variety of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) as a means of reducing debt loads.   
While an extensive literature exists on the practical workings of these programs and on 
the level of their usage, there exists a dearth of theoretical explanations for the development of 
debt-for-nature swaps.  The premise of this paper is that debt-for-nature swaps can be interpreted 
as an application of the Coase Theorem to the problem of environmental degradation. 
In 1960, Ronald Coase published "The Problem of Social Cost".  This work has had 
tremendous influence on the way that the legal system and many economists view the problem of 
externalities or third-party costs.  As Coase stated in his 1991 Nobel prize acceptance speech: 
"I explained in ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ that what are traded on the market are not, as is 
often supposed by economists, physical entities, but the rights to perform certain actions..." 
The Coase Theorem, in simple terms, posits that in the presence of low transaction costs 
and competitive markets, solutions aimed at maximizing societal welfare will present 
themselves.  Coase presented an alternative to the widely accepted Pigouvian solution for 
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externalities.  In the Pigouvian framework, direct taxation can be used as a means of reducing the 
social costs associated with externalities.  The Coasean solution becomes especially pertinent 
when the influence of international institutions is limited.  The ability to institute Pigouvian 
solutions on an inter-country basis is severely limited because it involves taxation across national 
boundaries.  
I hypothesize that debt-for-nature swaps exhibit secondary markets for debt which are 
relatively competitive combined with three institutional entities willing to propose non-
traditional solutions to the dual problems of debt and the environment - nations, environmental 
groups, and financial institutions.  
This paper investigates the current state of debt-for-nature swaps, though the major 
theme is to develop the theoretical ties between the Coase theorem and these swaps.  In his 
acceptance speech, Coase stated that it was his belief that the full impacts of his writings have 
yet to be determined in the arena of economic analysis.  This paper attempts to contribute to that 
progression. 
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I. Introduction
This paper investigates the relationship between debt-for-nature swaps and the 
institutional arrangements surrounding them.  Economist Ronald Coase has addressed a number 
of theoretical issues, which are relevant to the origins of debt-for-nature swaps and their 
potential to preserve the environment.   Debt-for-nature swaps exhibit aspects relevant to 
Coase’s work regarding the existence of the firm, the role of transaction costs, and the treatment 
of externalities.  
The paper posits that the weakness of international legal institutions, especially with 
regards to enforcement issues, has led to Coaseian bargaining in debt-for-nature swaps.  These 
swaps can be interpreted as a response by economic institutions to the realities that exist in 
international legal institutions.  (Namely, that these legal institutions are far more adept at 
assigning property rights ex ante than they are at assigning economic damages ex post.)  The 
paper is comprised of the following sections: a brief review of the Coase Theorem, an 
introduction to debt-for-nature swaps, the hypothesis that debt-for-nature swaps originated as a 
form of Coaseian bargaining, and a concluding summary. 
II. The Coase Theorem
 In a 1959 article, "The Federal Communications Commission," Ronald H. Coase 
introduced an alternative theoretical model that addressed the process of input allocation in 
competitive markets.  In this article, Coase addresses what he refers to as the "reciprocal nature" 
of market transactions that has subsequently become known as the Coase Theorem.  A more 
explicit development of the thesis was published in his 1960 article titled, "The Problem of 
Social Cost." 
 "The Problem of Social Cost" develops two basic theoretical themes: 1) the reasons why 
firms are formed in a competitive economy and 2) the role of the legal system, and in particular 
the assignment of property rights, in cases where production externalities exist.  The first theme 
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of “why firms exist" represents an extension of his 1937 work "The Nature of the Firm."  The 
later theme dominates and can be found in its nascent form in his Federal Communications 
Commission article.  The tie that binds these theoretical themes is transaction costs. 
Coase maintains that the modern firm owes its existence to transaction costs.  These are 
the costs associated with the discovery and announcement of trading positions, negotiation, 
contracting, and ensuring of contract compliance.  These costs are inherent to the price system 
and they can play an important role in production decisions.  If transaction costs become large 
relative to price, they can prevent potential trades from being realized.   
In the case of direct allocation by individuals through competitive market prices, the 
costs of obtaining, securing, and protecting the property rights to resources (i.e., transaction 
costs) must be subtracted from the gains that normally accrue to competitive market trades.   
Professor Coase reasons that if firms exist then it must be because the costs of factor allocation 
within the firm is efficient relative to the costs of direct factor allocation for individuals 
confronting the transactions costs of competitive market prices.   Where negotiations are 
complex and/or where affected parties are numerous, the likelihood is that firms will emerge as 
an alternative agent for decision-making increases.  Firms coexist with direct allocation by 
individuals because they provide a more efficient institutional arrangement for minimizing 
transaction costs.  
The second major theme represents a decisive rejection of the then universally accepted 
(at least by neoclassical economists) method of correcting for negative externalities.  
Specifically, Coase rejects the Pigouvian solution, which is to internalize the damage costs to the 
producer of the externality through government intervention.  Coase argues that the Pigouvian 
solution requires the legal system to assign damage in a capricious way.  Suppose neighbors A 
and B share a duplex basement, and that neighbor A decides to produce beer in his basement and 
the fumes from the brewing cause headaches for neighbor B.  Under a Pigouvian solution, 
neighbor A will be held accountable for the headaches of neighbor B, and the legal system will 
typically award damages to neighbor B or require the cessation of brewing in the basement by 
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neighbor A.  But what of the harm which comes from the cessation of beer brewing to neighbor 
A?  Does the activity of brewing have no value?  If not, then why did neighbor A begin brewing 
initially?  Coase makes the point that damages are of a "reciprocal nature" and that economic 
activity is attenuated under the Pigouvian solution.     
Drawing upon a legal case where a doctor built an examination room adjacent to a 
confectioners candy-mixing machine, Coase comes to this conclusion... 
... there is no analytical difference between the right to use a resource without direct 
harm to others and the right to conduct operations in such a way as to produce direct 
harm to others.  In each case something is denied to others: in one case, use of a 
resource; in the other, use of a mode of operation...[This example] also brings out the 
reciprocal nature of the relationship which tends to be ignored by economists who, 
following Pigou, approach the problem in terms of a difference between private and 
social products but fail to make clear that the suppression of the harm which A inflicts 
on B inevitably inflicts harm on A.  The problem is to avoid the more serious harm.i 
Coase notes that his ideas fundamentally alter the relationship between economic and 
legal systems.  Under the Pigouvian solution for externalities, a suit is brought before the court 
and the court is asked to assign liability and set compensatory economic payment.  The critical 
input from the economic system is an ex post input; it occurs after the harm is done.  The 
Coaseian solution for externalities is an ex ante solution.  Here, the critical economic decisions 
rely upon the initial assignment of property rights by the legal system before the harm is done.  
According to Coase, the initial assignment of property rights is, under conditions of low 
transaction costs, irrelevant -- the economically optimal allocation of resources will prevail 
under any initial assignment.  As Coase puts it ”...the delineation of property rights is an 
essential prelude to market transactions; but the ultimate result (which maximizes the value of 
production) is independent of the legal decision.ii   Once legal rights are established, negotiated 
modifications to the contract can and will occur where benefits exceed costs. 
While University of Chicago economists initially rejected these ideas, the Chicago brand 
of free-market, neoclassicism fits well within Coase’s work. The role of government is 
minimized if one accepts Coaseian solutions for externalities.  As noted above, Coase views the 
113 
firm as an alternative to the market in allocating resources when the costs of using the market to 
allocate are high relative to the administrative costs associated with the operation of a firm.  In 
turn, and following the same reasoning, if the costs of establishing or extending a firm are high 
relative to government regulation then Coase cedes that "...direct government regulation" 
remains as an alternative means of allocation.  He states that government regulation is most 
likely to emerge as the allocation device of choice "...[when] a large number of people are 
involved and in which therefore the costs of handling the problem through the market or the firm 
are high."iii 
The use of direct regulation by the government introduces an entirely new set of 
problems and Coase warns the reader that this agency creates costs.  He is particularly concerned 
about two issues: 1) the subversive role that rent seeking is likely to play in allocations, and 2) 
the complete absence of competitive restraint.  Furthermore, neither of these is viewed as a 
significant problem under either direct allocation in markets or agency allocation through the 
firm.iv 
The government is, in a sense, a super-firm since it is able to influence not only the 
factors of production but also the institutional rules surrounding it.  Any firm operating in non-
monopolistic markets is subject to the competition of other firms.  Competitors might administer 
the same activities at a lower cost and there is always the alternative of market transactions if the 
internal administrative costs become too great.  The government is able, if it wishes, to avoid the 
market altogether, which a firm can never do.v  
Coase deplores the fact that many turn to government regulation with too much zeal and 
too little caution.  "It is my belief that economists, and policy-makers generally, have tended to 
overestimate the advantages which come from government regulation."vi  Regardless, Coase 
clearly leaves open the possibility that we could turn to the government as an agency of 
allocation if market and firm failure are evident and persistent.   
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III. Debt-for-Nature Swaps
Debt-for-nature swaps have arisen as a partial solution to the dual problems of less 
developed country (LDC) debt and environmental degradation.  Environmental groups or other 
governments purchase outstanding debt issues of a LDC in secondary markets in exchange for 
the LDC government's commitment to preserve a defined ecosystem.   This has been enabled by 
two related factors: many of the remaining large and unique ecosystems are found in LDCs, 
which also have substantial international debt. 
As environmental awareness has grown, appeals from environmental groups and the 
governments of developed countries have yielded little real progress in preserving ecosystems in 
LDCs.  LDC governments have pointed out that the higher-income countries developed their 
frontiers with few restraints; so moral or ethical appeals to preserve the environment appear self-
serving.  Some arguments for preservation based upon enlightened self-interest have emerged.  
Eco-tourism has been touted as one potentially valuable use of preserved areas.  There are also 
arguments concerning the potential economic value from drugs and medicines that can be 
realized in these unique ecosystems.  The contributions of these areas to the preservation of 
biodiversity generally are also an important consideration.  Unfortunately, allusions to future 
prospects in countries confronting immediate problems with the simple sustenance of human life 
may hold little political and moral weight.  Concern for the environment is linked to national 
income levels, and low-wage countries are less likely to embrace preservation as a result.vii  The 
alternative is to convince governments that the preservation of such land is in their best interest.  
This path involves the use of substantial political capital, an explicit or implicit framework of 
taxation for raising the funds needed and tradeoffs with other national priorities.   
In order to preserve ecosystems, those interested in habitat preservation must establish 
legitimate claims to property rights through the purchase or lease of the land in question.  In 
North America, numerous examples of such claims exist including the purchase of wetlands by  
Ducks Unlimited in the U.S. and Canada and land acquisition programs of The Nature 
Conservancy.  At the international level, environmental groups which have funded international 
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debt-for-nature swaps include: The Nature Conservancy, the World Wildlife Fund, the Puerto 
Rico Conservation Trust, the Missouri Botanical Garden, the National Park Foundation of Costa 
Rica, Conservation International, and the Rain Forest Alliance.viii  The concept also has the 
support of a number of additional environmental groups.ix   
The appeal of debt-for-nature swaps is multifaceted; LDC governments, international 
banks, and environmental groups do not view these swaps as a zero sum game.  For LDC 
governments, debt-for-nature swaps can reduce extant debt load and provide expert guidance in 
the management, maintenance, and preservation of domestic ecosystems.  Another appealing 
aspect for LDC governments is that both domestic and international political benefits can be 
realized.  For instance, in the case of a Bolivian debt-for-nature swap, the agreement included 
provisions for the maintenance of indigenous Indian peoples.  Where the extraction activities of 
native human populations are biologically and historically sustainable, native patterns of 
logging, hunting, and fishing can be maintained.  Additionally, title and deed to the lands remain 
in the hands of nationals.  Internationally, LDC governments can point to the swaps as a measure 
of cooperation in global environmental policies.  LDCs gain to the extent that this cooperation 
accrues political capital with foreign governments and international agencies. 
For lending institutions, debt-for-nature swaps can provide reductions in liabilities.  
Where the likelihood of debt payback is low, the lending institution can recoup at least some of 
the debt obligation.  While it is true that the debt is typically sold at discount, discounting of bad 
debt is hardly confined to debt-for-nature swaps.  What is added to the secondary market for 
international debt is a demand that did not exist in the market prior to debt-for-nature swaps.  
Price effects on debt will depend upon the magnitude of the swap purchases relative to other 
purchases and the relative elasticity’s of the demand and supply curves.  
For environmental groups, debt-for-nature swaps represent an extension of direct land 
acquisition programs that have existed for a number of years in North America (as noted on the 
previous page.)  Debt-for-natures swaps provide direct habitat preservation and often include 
some level of input into land, forest, and wildlife management practices.  Additionally, debt-for-
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nature swaps provide leverage for the limited funds available within these organizations for the 
direct purchase of environmentally sensitive lands.  The degree of leverage depends upon the 
spread between the face value of outstanding debt liabilities and the discounted prices in 
secondary markets.   
The first facilitated debt-for-nature swap was between Bolivia and Conservation 
International in 1987.  This swap involved the purchase of $650,000 of outstanding debt.  The 
debt was discounted to approximately $100,000 and a Swiss bank purchased it through Citibank 
Investment Bank.  In return, the government of Bolivia agreed to preserve approximately 
3,700,000 acres surrounding the pre-existing 334,000 acre Beni Biosphere Reservex.   The initial 
Bolivian - Conservation International swap has served as a model for subsequent swaps in Costa 
Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Madagascar, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, 
Tanzania, and Zambia.  As of late 1991, approximately $101,726,000 worth of LDC debt had 
been retired at a cost of approximately $18,495,000.  The average discount in the secondary debt 
markets over all of these exchanges has been 82%.xi 
It seems unlikely that debt-for-nature swaps will serve as anything other than one method 
among a host of debt relief measures, though the potential for them to play an increased role 
exists.  The "Enterprise for the Americas Initiatives" contains provisions that are likely to make 
these trades more attractive to all parties.  The provisions are also likely to extend debt-for-
nature swaps beyond agreements to halt the destruction of unique ecosystems.  Alternative 
agreements that have been put forward are generally aimed at linking debt-for-nature swaps to 
the economic and environmental sustainability of more traditional development projects such as 
potable water and sanitation infrastructure.  
IV. Debt-for-Nature Swaps as an Application of Coaseian Bargaining
There are a number of characteristics inherent to debt-for-nature swaps that imply the 
existence and efficacy of Coaseian bargaining.  Among those aspects of debt-for-nature swaps 
which have Coaseian qualities one would include: the mutuality of harm, the clear lack of legal 
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guidance concerning ex post restitution, the competitive aspects of the markets in which they 
take place, and particulars concerning transaction costs. 
  The first of these characteristics is the mutuality of harm.  In "The Problem of Social 
Cost" ,Coase outlined Bryant vs. Lefever where the externality involved smoke back-drafting 
through a chimney into the house of the plaintiff.  The back draft resulted when the defendant 
raised a wall adjacent to the chimney.  At the initial trial the case was treated by the court as a 
traditional externality problem -- damages were awarded to the plaintiff.  The court determined 
that the newly built wall caused the chimney to become inappropriately drafted.  The subsequent 
appeals court disagreed, placing the blame on the plaintiff. "It is the plaintiff who causes the 
nuisance by lighting a coal fire in a place so near the defendants' wall, that the smoke does not 
escape, but comes into his house.  Let the plaintiff cease to light his fire, let him move his 
chimney, let him carry it higher, and there would be no nuisance."xii   
This case presents a mutual harm, and the courts clearly identify the ambiguity in 
assigning blame.  For Coase, any legal outcome is arbitrary.  Quoting Coase, “Who caused the 
smoke nuisance? …the answer seems fairly clear.  The smoke nuisance was caused by the 
defendant who built the wall and the man who lit the fires.  Given the fires, there would be no 
smoke nuisance without the wall; given the wall, there would be no smoke nuisance without the 
fires.  Eliminate the wall or the fires and the smoke nuisance would disappear."xiii  The parallel 
notion in debt-for-nature swaps is this: environmental groups view the action of destruction of 
forested areas by LDCs as harmful; simultaneously, the LDCs view external restraints on 
development policies as intrusive and paternalistic.   
Mutuality among the affected parties increases the potential for debt-for-nature swaps.  
For example, biologists agree that forests process the carbons emitted through the large scale 
burning of fossil fuels.  LDCs can make the argument that their maintenance of global carbon 
sinks represent an uncompensated positive externality, which benefits high income countries.  
Research shows that per capita emissions of carbon dioxide are negligible until levels of around 
$8,000 per capita income and that emissions then increase at rapid rates.xiv  One view of this is 
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that LDCs should be compensated for their provision of large-scale carbon sinks that offset the 
relatively high carbon dioxide emissions of high-income countries. 
A second aspect of debt-for-nature swaps, which favors the development of Coaseian 
solutions, is the nearly complete absence of effective legal institutions at the world level.  The 
development of world legal institutions is in its nascent stages and the abilities of existing 
"global" legal institutions, such as the International Court of Justice, to judge and assign 
damages where sovereign nations are involved are weak.  Even if the institutions were able to 
judge and assign damages, the enforcement of ex post damage judgments would remain a 
problem. 
Under the Coase theorem, the role of legal institutions is shifted from an ex post 
delineation of judgment and damages to an ex ante definition of property rights.  Clearly defined 
property rights are required for Coaseian bargaining to be successful.  In the case of debt-for-
nature swaps, the lands that are offered are likely to embody clearly defined property rights. A 
majority of the lands involved in debt-for-nature swaps are "public" lands and the initial 
assignment is likely to be void of domestic ambiguity - they are those of the bargaining nation.xv  
Where boundaries are in dispute, it is likely that the dispute has been a long-standing one.xvi  If 
boundary disputes exist, the likelihood of the lands being acceptable to the debt-purchasing 
parties involved in swaps would fall dramatically. Thus, it seems that in the case of debt-for-
nature swaps, one ex ante stumbling block to Coaseian bargaining -- the initial assignment of 
property rights -- is removed.  
Property rights could cause problems for debt-for-nature swaps due to incomplete 
contracting.  The contract represents an agreement to set aside lands under certain conditions and 
terms and the initial agreement must be clearly understood by both parties.  The problems of 
addressing the temporal and spatial conditions of the contract seem minor compared to the 
conditions set for acceptable use.  It would be particularly important for the bargaining 
institutions to more completely define acceptable use including agreements on sustainability in 
resource extraction.  
119 
A third aspect of debt-for-nature swaps that mark them as Coaseian bargains is 
competitiveness.  As noted earlier, a number of nations have been involved in offering lands for 
debt service. In addition to environmental groups, nations have been active participants in debt-
for-nature swaps.xvii    LDC governments have cooperated enthusiastically because these lands 
have often already been set aside and the debt-for-nature swap includes provisions for assistance 
in the management of the lands.  The swaps also represent a method of extracting unrealized 
rents from those who believe that the preservation and maintenance of the lands provides 
positive benefits that accrue to non-domestic parties.  For LDC governments the risks associated 
with debt-for-nature swaps are minimal.  If the LDC government violates the conditions of the 
swap, then it is unlikely to galvanize international political pressure given the weakness of 
international legal institutions. 
A final aspect is the role of transaction costs, which are incurred at specific junctures of 
the trade.  Discovery, announcements, negotiations, and contracting are ex ante activities 
whereas monitoring and compliance are ex post activities.  For Coaseian bargaining to work, 
transaction costs must be low.  In the case of debt-for-nature swaps, ex ante transaction costs will 
likely vary with the number of parties and the complexity of the particular transaction.  In 
addition, the ability to guarantee ex post enforcement of the agreement will affect the complexity 
of the ex ante negotiations.  
The competitiveness of the secondary debt market is also important.  Historically, 
demanders of debt in these swaps have been  able to obtain deep discounts ranging from 40% to 
88%.xviii   In turn, banks holding the bad debt may look upon the swap as a terminal option for 
recovering some portion of their investment.  Each of these factors drive the parties towards 
trade and may help to reduce the perceived ex ante transactions costs.  
The problems of ex post costs of monitoring and ensuring contract compliance are 
difficult ones.  The potential for effective legal remedies is limited.  It has been noted that 
international legal institutions have great difficulty in enforcing cross country rules and 
agreements.  If they cannot effectively assign judgment and damage or enforce claims, then ex 
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post costs of compliance become high -- perhaps even prohibitive.   Without specific information 
regarding the costs of monitoring compliance, parties may have assumed that the costs are small 
and until other information is made available they will not act as a deterrent to future swaps.   
Perhaps, knowing that effective legal action is unlikely, each party incorporates this pre-existing 
knowledge into the agreed upon price in the swap agreement.  Certainly, the sustainability of 
debt-for-nature swaps hinges on market participants to have faith that contractual conditions will 
be honored.  If this is not the case, then the ex post costs of monitoring and compliance represent 
a major threat to the continued use of debt-for-nature swaps.  While successfully negotiated 
swaps are the product of solid ex ante Coaseian bargaining, the weak ex post conditions may 
make them short-lived phenomena.  Future research into the actual transaction costs associated 
with these swaps is needed.  Though ex ante costs may be more clearly discernible, ex post costs 
may not be.  
V. Summary
LDC governments face a range of problems that accompany low per capita incomes and 
the issues of environment degradation simultaneously.  When these governments need a means 
of increasing domestic income, resource extraction is often a substantial, direct, and immediately 
available source.  The positive relationship between increasing national per capita income and 
concern for the environment is well established and for many LDCs the former takes precedent.  
LDCs are leery of external regulations that hinder their development.  Environmentalists, usually 
from the More Developed Countries, are pushing for limits that can impede economic growth in 
LDCs.  Programs which require "sustainable" development, yet offer no quid pro quo, can be 
viewed as essentially free-rider claims on domestic resources from nations who have historically 
treated their frontier boundaries differently than is being currently proposed.  Within the arenas 
of domestic and international politics, charges of paternalism/imperialism on the part of the more 
developed countries may be given credence.  Additionally, LDC governments can make an 
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effective argument that the continued provision of unique ecosystems represents an 
uncompensated positive externality to the rest of the world. 
Perhaps a consensus can be reached that demarcates the appropriate role for government 
in these swaps.  Most economists agree that the primary role of government is to define and 
enforce property rights.  Though Coase did note the potential role of domestic governmental 
institutions to intervene in cases of market failure, he did so with trepidation, and he did not 
address the workings of international institutions that were in their infancy when the Coase 
theorem was first introduced.  Perhaps one appropriate role for these international institutions is 
to broker the swaps and thus minimize the transaction costs that accrue to the swap participants.  
If debt-for-nature swaps are to survive, minimizing ex ante transaction costs and ex post costs of 
monitoring and compliance is crucial.  It seems within the purview of international agencies to 
act as brokers by coordinating the swaps and in doing so providing a more efficient vehicle for 
minimizing the ex ante transaction costs of announcement, discovery, and negotiation. 
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End Notes 
i     Coase restates this argument in the beginning of Section II of "The Problem of Social Cost."  
He wrote [that] "The traditional approach has tended to obscure the nature of the choice that 
has to be made.  The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B 
and what has to be decided is: how should we restrain A?  But this is wrong.  We are dealing 
with a problem of reciprocal nature.  To avoid the harm to B would inflict harm on A.  The 
real question that has to be decided is: should A be allowed to harm B or should B be 
allowed to harm A?  The problem is to avoid the more serious harm."  
ii    See "The Federal Communications Commission,"  pp. 26-27. 
iii    See "The Problem of Social Cost," p. 30. 
iv   It is not clear to the author how Coase incorporates the costs to firms in their attempts to   
influence political bodies.    
v    See "The Problem of Social Cost," p. 29. 
vi    See "The Problem of Social Cost," p. 30. 
vii   Concern over environmental problems within a given populus and the relationship between 
types of environmental problems and per capita GDP are given full discussion in the World 
Development Report, 1992, p. 11, figure 4. 
viii  See "Debt-for-Nature Swaps: A New Agenda." p. 36. 
ix    Other environmental groups which have endorsed the swaps include: Rainforest Action  
Network (San Francisco, CA), Cultural Survival, Greenpeace USA (New York, N.Y.), Earth 
Island Institute (San Francisco, CA), the Environmental Defense Fund (Washington, D.C.), 
the Frank Weeden Foundation and the National Wildlife Foundation.  See "Debt-for-Nature 
Swaps: Effective But Not Enforceable, " p. 142.  
x     Additional details of the swap and the agreement concerning the legal status of the lands 
involved can be found in "Debt-for-Nature Swaps: Effective But Not Enforceable." pp. 142-
5. 
xi    See "Debt-for-Nature Swaps: A New Agenda," p. 36. 
xii   See "The Problem of Social Cost," pp. 23-24. 
xiii   See "The Problem of Social Cost," p. 25. 
xiv   See The World Development Report - Development and the Environment, 1992, p. 11. 
xv    For the purposes of this paper, domestic legal disputes preclude participation in debt-for-
nature swaps and clear title is not an issue.  Again, it seems reasonable that lands under any 
type of legal action would be unlikely to be acceptable to all parties involved in the debt-for-
nature swap.   
xvi   Lands in dispute among nations are often in dispute because they are perceived to have some 
economic value.  Given that the effect of debt-for-nature swaps is to provide more explicit 
recognition of the value of unique ecosystems future border disputes may be exasperated. 
xvii  Holland and Sweden are responsible for the two largest single swaps, both of which were 
with Costa Rica. 
xviii See "Debt-for-Nature Swaps: A New Agenda," p. 36. 
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